Links and References from AAUS Presentation
List of links and references from the presentation on 22 Sep 2016 at the AAUS Annual Symposium
Use of HF/E to resolve 'pilot error' by addressing system design
- Jones, R. ., & Fitts, P. . (1947). Analysis of factors contributing to 460 “pilot error” experiences in operating aircraft controls. Dayton, Ohio.
Fatality investigation vs. fatality research. Fatality investigation is conducted by legal authorities focused on a single case. The main purpose is the attribution of legal responsibility and this determines how the causation is established. In most cases, the inquiry ends with establishing the proximal cause of death.
- Denoble, P. J. (2014). Medical Examination of Diving Fatalities Symposium: Investigation of Diving Fatalities for Medical Examiners and Diving.
Model of Root Cause Analysis with Trigger, Disabling Action, Disabling Injury, Cause of Death
- Vann, R. D., & Lang, M. A. (2011). Recreational Diving Fatalities. In Proceedings of the Divers Alert Network 2010 April 8-10 Workshop. Conference proceedings, Durham, N.C.: Divers Alert Network.
Inside the Tube: Counterfactual and Retrospective
- Dekker, S. The Field Guide to Human Error, 3rd Edition
Incompetent and Unaware
- Unskilled and unaware of it: how difficulties in recognizing one's own incompetence lead to inflated self-assessments. Dunning, Kruger. 1999
Learning to fail - 449 times
- Black-box thinking. Mathew Syed
Endsley's Model of Situational Awareness
- Endsley, M. R. (1995). Toward a theory of situation awareness in dynamic systems. Human Factors: The Journal of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, 37(1), 32–64. Journal Article.
System 1 & System 2
- Thinking. Fast and Slow. Daniel Kahneman.
Systemic Migration to the Boundaries
- Amalberti, R., Vincent, C., Auroy, Y., & de Saint Maurice, G. (2006). Violations and migrations in health care: a framework for understanding and management. Quality & Safety in Health Care, 15 Suppl 1, i66-71. http://doi.org/10.1136/qshc.2005.015982
Going Solid
- Cook, R., & Rasmussen, J. (2005). “Going solid”: a model of system dynamics and consequences for patient safety.
Normalisation of Deviance
- Vaughan, D. (1996). The Challenger lauch decision: Risky technology, culture and deviance at NASA. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Group interaction in High Risk Environments (GIHRE) - Problem Solving Communications in the Cockpit
- Klampfer, B., Flin, R., Helmreich, R. L., Hausler, R., Sexton, B., Fletcher, G., … Dieckmann, P. (2001). Group Interaction in High Risk Environments: Enhancing Performance in High Risk Environments, Recommendations for the Use of Behavioural Markers. Berlin: GIHRE.
Process Communication Model
- https://humaninthesystem.mykajabi.com/p/pcm-healthcare
Tuckman's Team Development Model
- Developmental sequence in small groups. Tuckman, Bruce W.
Psychological Bulletin, Vol 63(6), Jun 1965, 384-399. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/h0022100
DAN Checklist Study
- Ranapurwala, S. I., Denoble, P. J., Poole, C., Kucera, K. L., Marshall, S. W., & Wing, S. (2015). The effect of using a pre-dive checklist on the incidence of diving mishaps in recreational scuba diving: a cluster-randomized trial. International Journal of Epidemiology, dyv292. http://doi.org/10.1093/ije/dyv292
The Problem with Checklists
- Catchpole, K. R., & Russ, S. (2015). The problem with Checklists. BMJ Quality & Safety. http://doi.org/10.1136/bmjqs-2015- 004431
Online Microclass for Human Factors Skills in Diving
- https://www.humanfactors.academy/store/C3V4Jnz4
