Outcomes are so sexy and attractive…

In the mid-1980s, there was a flight safety film produced which showed a Royal Air Force pilot walking out to his single-seat Jaguar fighter aircraft for a training sortie. He prepares the aircraft, starts it up and takes-off down the runway. Unfortunately, the aircraft has an engine failure immediately after take-off, but the pilot can’t jettison the external stores, and crashes and he dies because the aircraft doesn’t have enough power to fly on a single-engine given its full fuel load and the heavy external stores. It transpires that during the pre-take-off checks, the pilot forgot to arm the stores jettison system, and even though he is trying to jettison them, they won’t go because there is a safety system in place to stop an inadvertent release. It would be quite easy to blame this highly trained and professional pilot for forgetting to do something which was part of his pre-take-off checklist. However, the Royal Air Force recognised that it takes many things...

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Listy kontrolne CCR, nie zapewniają niezawodności sprzętu

„Jednym z kluczowych zagadnień których uczę, jest zrozumienie, że bezpieczeństwo nie musi oznaczać braku awarii czy wypadków, a raczej jest to istnienie reguł i zabezpieczeń oraz wydolność systemu czy organizacji do przetrwania awarii w sposób bezpieczny”. To cytat autorstwa Todda Conklina, badacza i praktyka z branży bezpieczeństwa i wydajności w Stanach Zjednoczonych. Chodzi o to, że rozwijamy umiejętności techniczne i nietechniczne oraz projektujemy sprzęt, procedury i szkolenia oraz zarządzamy środowiskiem w taki sposób, aby można było zarządzać ryzykiem na akceptowalnym poziomie. Nie jesteśmy jednak w stanie zaprojektować ani zarządzać wszystkim, nie wszystko można przewidzieć, więc musimy być w stanie poradzić sobie z tymi „niezaplanowanymi zdarzeniami”, a następnie udostępnić historię tego co się wydarzyło, aby inni mogli się z tego uczyć.

W nurkowaniu na obiegu zamkniętym jednym z najlepszych sposobów zapewnienia...

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I test pre-immersione e le liste di controllo non sono sempre sufficienti a prevenire problemi legati all’attrezzatura!

Uno dei concetti chiave che insegno è che la sicurezza non è necessariamente l’assenza di rischi od incidenti, ma piuttosto la presenza di barriere e difese che permettono al sistema di fallire in sicurezza. Questa definizione arriva da Todd Conklin, un ricercatore e professionista che lavora nell’ambito della sicurezza e delle performance umane nell’industria americana. L’idea è che si sviluppino delle capacità tecniche e non tecniche, che si creino attrezzature, procedure ed addestramenti e che si gestisca la situazione così che si possano affrontare rischi ad un livello gestibile. Tuttavia, non possiamo creare o gestire qualunque cosa in anticipo, quindi dobbiamo essere in grado di affrontare gli eventi imprevisti e poi condividerne le storie, in modo che anche gli altri possano imparare.
 

Nelle immersioni con il rebreather, uno dei modi migliori per accertarsi che la macchina sia pronta e sicura è di...

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CCR pre-dive checks and checklists are not always enough to prevent an equipment-based accident!

One of the key themes I teach is that safety is not necessarily the absence of accidents or incidents, but rather the presence of barriers and defences and the capacity of the system to fail safely. This quote comes from Todd Conklin, a researcher and practitioner working in the safety and human performance industry in the US. The idea is that we develop technical and non-technical skills and design the equipment, procedures and training and manage the environment so that risk is managed at an acceptable level. However, we can't design or manage everything beforehand, so we need to be able to handle those 'odd events' and then share the stories so that others may learn. 

In rebreather diving, one of the best ways to ensure that the unit is safe to dive is to make sure that the build and final pre-dive checks are completed. However, even if this is done diligently on the surface including packing the scrubber and then executing the complete set of final checks, things can go...

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It's the little things that catch you out...

Humans like to do things efficiently, or as some call it, cutting corners. The problem is that when the configuration changes and the diver cannot recall the 'situation' and it bites, it sometimes ends up with a dead diver. 

Complacency is a term often used as one of the key factors when it comes to diving fatality reports. The problem is that complacency is only really apparent after the event because we have had something occur that shows us how far we are from the ideal. The same mental developmental processes which allow us to operate efficiently are also the same processes which can lead to an accident. Complacency can be summed up as the difference between the perceived model of the world and the reality of the situation. To save time, humans create models of expectation of what is happening around them so that we don't have to process vast amounts of information. If nothing changes, we run that mental model making assumptions about what will happen in X...

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